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Abstract—Communication is not necessarily made secure by
the use of encryption alone. The mere existence of communication
is often enough to raise suspicion and trigger investigative
actions. Covert channels aim to hide the very existence of the
communication. The huge amount of data and vast number of
different protocols in the Internet makes it ideal as a high-
bandwidth vehicle for covert communications. A number of
researchers have proposed different techniques to encode covert
information into the IP Time To Live (TTL) field. This is a noisy
covert channel since the TTL field is modified between covert
sender and receiver. For computing the channel capacity it is
necessary to know the probability of channel errors. In this paper
we derive analytical solutions for the error probabilities of the
different encoding schemes. We simulate the different encoding
schemes and compare the simulation results with the analytical
error probabilities. Finally, we compare the performance of the
different encoding schemes for an idealised error distribution and
an empirical TTL error distribution obtained from real Internet
traffic.
Index Terms—Security, Covert Channels, Network Protocols
I. INTRODUCTION
Often it is thought that the use of encryption is sufficient
to secure communication. However, encryption only prevents
unauthorised parties from decoding the communication. In
many cases the simple existence of communication or changes
in communication patterns, such as an increased message
frequency, are enough to raise suspicion and reveal the onset
of events. Covert channels aim to hide the very existence
of the communication. They hide within pre-existing (overt)
communications channels by encoding additional semantics
onto ‘normal’ behaviours of the overt channels.
Lampson introduced covert channels as a means to secretly
leak information between different processes on monolithic
systems [1]. In recent years the focus has shifted to covert
channels in network protocols [2]. The huge amount of data
and vast number of different protocols in the Internet makes it
ideal as a high-bandwidth vehicle for covert communications.
The capacity of covert channels in computer networks has
greatly increased because of new high-speed network tech-
nologies, and this trend is likely to continue. Even if only one
bit per packet can be covertly transmitted, a large Internet site
could lose 26GB of data annually [3].
Covert channels are primarily used to circumvent existing
information security policies, to ex-filtrate information from
an organisation or country in a manner that does not raise
suspicions of the network owners or operators. Although
network covert channels may not be used frequently today,
because of increased measures against ‘open channels’, such as
the free transfer of memory sticks in and out of organisations,
the use of covert channels in computer networks will increase
in the near future [4].
The IP Time To Live (TTL) header field limits the lifetime
of an IP packet, preventing packets from living forever during
routing loops [5]. A packet’s TTL is set by the sender
and decremented by each network element along the path
processing the packet’s IP header (e.g. routers and firewalls).
Packets are discarded if their TTL becomes zero while still
in transit. A number of researchers have proposed different
techniques to encode covert information into the TTL field
[6]–[8]. Since routers and middleboxes modify the TTL fields
of packets in flight and packets can take different paths through
the network the TTL covert channel is a noisy channel [9].
In this paper we derive analytical solutions for the error
probabilities of three known and one new TTL covert channel
encoding scheme. The motivation behind this work is that the
channel capacity can be computed if the error probability is
known (e.g. using existing channel models such as the binary
channel [10]). We simulate the different encoding schemes and
compare the simulation results with the theoretical predictions
demonstrating that our analytical error probabilities are valid.
We also present the characteristics of realistic TTL error
distributions based on real Internet traffic obtained from traffic
traces. Finally, we compare the performance of the different
encoding schemes for an idealised error distribution used in
the simulation and a realistic error distribution obtained from
the traffic traces.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we briefly
explain the basic concepts of covert channels. In Section III
we define the channel error and present empirical TTL error
distributions based on captured traffic traces. In Section IV
we derive analytical solutions for the error probabilities of
the different encoding schemes. In section V we compare the
simulation results with the analytical results, and also compare
the performance of the different encoding techniques for
idealised and realistic error distributions. Section VI concludes
and outlines future work.
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II. COVERT CHANNELS OVERVIEW
The de-facto standard covert channel communication model
is the prisoner problem [11]. Two people, Alice and Bob, are
thrown into prison and intend to escape. To agree on an escape
plan they need to communicate, but all their messages are
monitored by Wendy the warden. If Wendy finds any signs
of suspicious messages she will place Alice and Bob into
solitary confinement – making an escape impossible. Alice and
Bob must exchange innocuous messages containing hidden
information that (hopefully) Wendy will not notice.
Extending this scenario towards communication networks,
Alice and Bob use two networked computers to communi-
cate. They run some innocuous overt communication between
their computers, with a hidden covert channel. Alice and
Bob share a secret useful for determining covert channel
encoding parameters and for encrypting/authenticating the
hidden messages. For practical purposes Alice and Bob may
well be the same person (e.g. a hacker ex-filtrating restricted
information). Wendy manages the network and can monitor the
passing traffic for covert channels or alter the passing traffic
to disrupt or eliminate covert channels. Figure 1 depicts the
communication model (Alice sending to Bob).










Figure 1. The prisoner problem – model for covert channel communication
In computer networks Alice and Bob do not have to be the
sender and receiver of the overt communication. One or both
of them may act as a middleman (see Figure 2). If Alice can
observe and manipulate an existing overt communication from
an innocent sender that reaches Bob, she can insert a covert
channel into it. Bob does not need to be the receiver of the
overt communication, but merely must be able to observe it
to decode the hidden information. If Bob can also alter the
overt communication, he can even remove the covert channel
preventing the receiver of the overt communication from
discovering it. A middleman could be located for example
inside a network router or inside an end host’s network stack.





Figure 2. Communication scenarios depending on sender and receiver
locations
III. TTL COVERT CHANNEL ERRORS
In this section we analyse the sources of error for covert
channels implemented through modulation of the TTL value.
A covert channel bit is mapped onto a TTL value, or a
succession of TTL values in a number of different ways.
Although reasonably stable between two end-points, the TTL
value is nonetheless subject so some noise:
• Deletions of bits caused by loss of overt packets,
• Bit errors caused by reordering of overt packets and
• Bit errors caused by TTL modifications and path changes.
In this paper we only focus on bit errors caused by TTL
modifications and path changes. In future work we will work
on a combined model for all the different errors. Routers and
middleboxes modify the TTL fields of packets in flight and
packets can take different paths through the network between
covert sender and receiver. The result is that TTL values within
a packet flow change between consecutive packets and this
causes bit errors on the TTL covert channel.
In the analysis that follows we define a ’TTL error’ as a
deviation in the TTL value from the most common (modal)
value of the TTL during the life of a packet flow (identified
by the 5-tuple of IP addresses, port numbers and protocol).
Let the most common TTL value be TTLnorm. Then for a
packet i of the flow the TTL error is:
Xi = TTLi − TTLnorm. (1)
We analysed TTL changes for seven packet traces of differ-
ent size, origin and date containing a mix of traffic (including
web, peer-to-peer, game, and email traffic). We only consider
flows with at least four packets and at least one packet per
second to limit the amount of data. The traffic traces are
described in more detail in [9]. Figure 3 and 4 show the
TTL error distributions for the Leipzig and Waikato trace
respectively. Note that the y-axes are logarithmic and we only






















Figure 3. TTL error distribution for the Leipzig dataset
The empirical error probability is less than 0.5%. Error val-
ues are largely confined between -200 and 200, and the error
probability does not monotonically decrease with increasing
TTL error. For some datasets there are characteristic peaks
around ±64, ±128 and ±191 (see Figure 4). These peaks are
caused by middleboxes manipulating the TTL field of packets






















Figure 4. TTL error distribution for the Waikato dataset
of TCP flows [9]. For space reasons we cannot show the other
distributions but their main characteristics are fairly similar.
IV. ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In order to determine the capacity of a channel, it is
necessary to determine its error probability distribution. In this
section we derive error probability distributions for a number
of different covert channels that modulate the TTL in different
ways.
A. Assumptions
Let the discrete random variable Xi be the TTL error of a
packet i. We base our analysis on the following assumptions:
1) The covert data is uniform random distributed (the
probability of a 0 or 1 being transmitted is equal to
1
2
). This is the case if the covert data is encrypted with
a cipher producing a uniform random distribution.
2) We assume that only one bit of covert data is encoded
per TTL. This simplifies the analysis and intuitively also
maximises the stealth of the channel (future research will
investigate encoding multiple bits).
3) We assume all Xi are independent identical distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables and the probability distribution
is stationary (reasonable assumption if the covert sender
encodes covert data into multiple parallel flows).
B. Direct Encoding
Qu et al. proposed to encode covert bits directly into the
TTL field [6]. The least significant bit in each TTL is replaced
by the covert bit to be sent (see Figure 5). Since the TTL is
decremented by one per hop between the covert sender and
receiver, the receiver needs to know the hop count in order to
decode the covert information.
TTL x Covert Bit
Figure 5. Direct Encoding of covert bits into the TTL field
For direct encoding techniques the error probability only
depends on the error occurring for each packet independently
of other packets. Errors occur if the absolute value of the TTL
error is greater than zero and an odd number. Because even
errors do not modify the lowest bit, they do not cause an error
in the covert channel. Since the maximum TTL value is 255




P (X = 2k + 1). (2)
C. Mapped Encoding
In mapped encoding schemes a 0-bit and a 1-bit are encoded
as two different TTL values. Usually one of the TTL values
is TTLnorm of the packet flow and the other value is a slight
modification. Qu et al. proposed encoding a 0-bit as TTLnorm
and a 1-bit as increase of TTLnorm by some integer Δ [6].
Zander et al. proposed to encode a 0-bit as TTLnorm and a 1-
bit as decrease of TTLnorm by some integer Δ [8]. Effectively
Δ is the absolute difference between the TTL value for a
logical 0 and the TTL value for a logical 1. Figure 6 shows
an example for both techniques.
Covert Bit 0 1 1 0 1
Qu04
Za06





Figure 6. Mapped encoding by modulating the TTL value
We assume that the receiver either knows the mapping or
learns the mapping by watching the TTL stream and assuming
the two most common TTL values are the symbols for a logical
0 and a logical 1. Then the error probability only depends
on the error occurring for each packet independently of other
packets.
First we derive the error probability for Za06 encoding. The
error probability for 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 errors is not identical.
The probability for 0 → 1 errors is:






where . is the ceiling function. The probability for 1 → 0
errors is smaller for even Δ because we assume the receiver
decodes a 1-bit in case the received symbol is exactly the
threshold value (value in the middle between a 0-bit and 1-
bit):









Given assumption 1 it does not affect the overall error
probability how the receiver decides at the threshold. However,
in general it is best to decode the threshold value as the
bit occurring most frequently in the data. The overall error
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If the error distribution is symmetric PMZa06 and PMQu04
are identical.
D. Differential Encoding
Differential encoding encodes the covert bits as change
between the TTL values of subsequent packets. Lucena et
al. described a technique to modulate the IPv6 Hop Limit
field (the IP TTL equivalent in IPv6) [7]. They proposed to
encode one bit per packet pair where a logical 1 is encoded
as TTL increase by Δ and a logical 0 as TTL decrease by Δ
(referred to as Lu05 encoding). This technique is problematic
because long series of 0 or 1 bits lead to a large decrease
or increase of the TTL. Since the TTL is an 8-bit field it
can actually happen that the TTL value ‘wraps-around’ in the
number space. Therefore, we also analyse an improved novel
differential encoding technique here.
The sender encodes a logical 0 by repeating the last TTL
value. A logical 1 is encoded by a TTL change, alternating
between the two possible values (see Table I). The receiver
decodes a constant TTL as logical 0 and a TTL change as
logical 1. The scheme is similar to the Alternate Mark Inver-
sion (AMI) coding (therefore referred to as AMI encoding).
Table I
MODIFIED TTL BASED ON COVERT BIT AND PREVIOUS TTL
Encode Previous TTL Current TTL
0 TTL TTL
0 TTL - Δ TTL - Δ
1 TTL TTL - Δ
1 TTL - Δ TTL
Figure 7 shows an example for Lu05 and AMI encoding
schemes (for the same sequence of covert bits as in Figure 6).
Covert Bit 0 1 1 0 1









Figure 7. Differential encoding of covert bits as TTL changes
Differential schemes encode covert bits as change between
two TTL values and therefore the error probability depends
on the difference of the two errors. Let Z = Y − X be
the difference of the two TTL error distributions of two
consecutive packets x and y. Then the probability that Z is
larger than some integer z can be computed using the discrete
convolution [12]:





P (X = n) · P (Y = m + n). (7)
For AMI encoding a 0 → 1 error occurs when the absolute
value of Z is larger then Δ
2
(assuming at the threshold the
receiver always decodes a 0-bit). A 1 → 0 error occurs when







) and the bit is encoded as TTL







the bit is encoded as TTL increase. This is because any TTL
change larger than 
2
is decoded as logical 1. The probability
that a logical 1 is encoded as increase/decrease is 1
2
given















































For Lu05 a 0 → 1 error occurs when Z is larger than Δ
(assuming at the threshold the receiver always decodes a 0-bit)
and a 1 → 0 error occurs when Z is smaller equal than −Δ.








P (Z > Δ)
2
+
P (Z ≤ −Δ)
2
. (9)
Note that the peak-to-peak amplitude is 2Δ for Lu05 in
comparison with all the other schemes.
E. Error Probability Distribution
The actual error probabilities can be computed based on
the empirical error distribution (see Section III). Alternatively,
if a theoretical model for the error exists, it can be used to
compute the error probabilities. Furthermore, Chebyshev’s in-
equality provides a very loose upper bound on the probability
independent of the actual distribution [12]. Assuming σ2 is
the variance and k is an integer (k ≥ 1) the upper bound on
the error probability is given by:





We simulate all encoding schemes with artificial overt traffic
and measure the error rates. We then compare the error
rates obtained in the simulation with the theoretical error
probabilities. Since there exist no models for realistic TTL
error distributions and the sole purpose of our simulation is
to verify our analytical error probabilities we use a simple
idealised TTL error model.
A. Methodology
A custom-build tool simulating a communication channel
between covert sender and receiver performs the simulation.
All encoding techniques described in Section IV have been
implemented. The sender-part of the simulator encodes covert
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bits into the TTL fields of a stream of artificial overt IP
packets (synthetic packet trace). Afterwards, the packets TTL
values are modified according to a specified error distribution
to simulate the channel error. Finally, the receiver-part of the
simulator decodes the covert bits from the stream of overt
packets. The error rate is the number of wrongly decoded bits
divided by the total number of bits.
In all simulations we use uniform random covert data to
avoid any bias towards specific input data. The overt data is a
synthetic packet trace with approximately 42 million packets.
The error is simulated using a Normal distributions with mean
zero and different standard deviations σ = {0.75, 1, 1.5}. The
values of σ have been chosen such that the resulting error rates
are in a similar range as the error rates for empirical TTL error
distributions (see Section V-C). Every simulated experiment is
repeated 20 times.
We define A as the peak-to-peak signal amplitude of the
encoding schemes (difference between the signal level of 1-bit
and 0-bit). Then for direct schemes A = 1, for Lu05 A = 2Δ
and for all other techniques A = Δ. We vary the amplitude
within a limited range to investigate its influence on the error
rate, but avoid large changes that would compromise stealth.
Since the Normal distribution is symmetric the mapped
error probabilities (Equations 5 and 6) give identical results.
Therefore we only simulate Za06 as representative for both
mapped encoding techniques. The most common TTL value
TTLnorm is always set to 128. For direct encoding schemes
we assume perfect knowledge of the true hop count at the
receiver. For Lu05 the receiver detects wrap-wounds meaning
no additional errors are introduced because of wrap-arounds
(see Section IV-D).
B. Comparison of Theoretical Error Probabilities and Simu-
lation Results
For comparing the simulation results with the theoretical
probabilities we use the relative root mean square error
(RMSE), which is the RMSE of the simulated error rates xi













Table II shows the relative RMSE for direct encoding. The
difference between theoretical results and simulation results is
very small for all σ.
Table II
THEORETICAL ERROR PROBABILITIES VS. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR
DIRECT ENCODING




Figure 8, 9 and 10 show the relative RMSEs for mapped,
AMI and Lu05 encoding respectively depending on the stan-
dard deviation of the error σ and the signal amplitude A.

























Figure 8. Theoretical error probabilities vs. simulation results for mapped
encoding

































































Figure 10. Theoretical error probabilities vs. simulation results for Lu05
encoding
The relative RMSE is generally ≤ 1.5% indicating a
good match between the theoretical error probabilities and
the simulation results. However, there are few larger relative
RMSEs in Figure 8 for A=5,6. These are not caused by errors
in the theoretical error probabilities or the simulation, but
simply by the fact when errors are rare because of small σ
and large A the statistical variance of the simulation results
is high. For example, the relative standard deviation (standard
deviation divided by theoretical error probability) increases
from ≤ 0.3% for A ≤ 4 to ≥ 2.7% for A > 4. A larger
number of overt packets in the synthetic trace or a much larger
number of repetitions would lead to smaller relative RMSEs.
C. Error Rates for Idealised and Empirical Error Distribution
Figure 11 compares the error rates of the different encoding
schemes for the idealised (Normal distributed) random noise
depending on the amplitude for standard deviations σ = 0.75













































Figure 12. Error probabilities for realistic error distribution (Leipzig dataset)
and σ = 1.5 (the smallest and highest values). Note that the
y-axis is logarithmic.
The figure shows that for smaller σ error rates are much
lower for the same amplitude. The error rates of the AMI
and Lu5 schemes are similar. Mapped encoding provides
noticeable smaller error rates than the differential schemes.
Direct encoding performs better than the differential schemes,
but worse than mapped techniques.
As shown in Section IV in reality the TTL error does not
follow a Normal distribution. Figure 12 shows the error rates
for the different encoding techniques and different amplitudes
for the empirical TTL error distribution obtained from the
Leipzig dataset (with a logarithmic y-axis). Since the empirical
distribution is not exactly symmetric we consider both mapped
techniques separately. For space reasons we cannot show
results for other datasets.
While the absolute error rates are different for the empirical
error distribution when compared to Figure 11, qualitatively
the performance of the techniques relative to each other is
similar. Mapped techniques have the lowest error rate and the
difference between both mapped schemes is small. Differential
techniques have the highest error rates with AMI and Lu05
showing similar performance. Direct encoding performs better
than differential encoding but worse then mapped encoding.
Since the empirical error distribution has long tails, the error
rate does not decrease as quickly with increasing amplitude as
in the case of idealised noise (see Figure 11).
Note that the empirical TTL error distributions exclude very
small flows (see Section IV). While Figure 12 provides a broad
indication of the real error rates, the actual error deviates if
the covert channel uses any flows regardless of their size.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A number of researchers proposed encoding covert infor-
mation into the IP TTL field. This covert channel is not error-
free because TTL fields are modified between covert sender
and receiver, and packets can take different paths through the
network. In this paper we derived analytical solutions for the
error probabilities of three known and one novel TTL covert
channel encoding techniques. We implemented all encoding
schemes and simulated their use with artificial overt traffic
and idealised noise. Our results show that the simulation error
rates are very similar to the theoretical error probabilities
for different standard deviations of the error and different
amplitudes of the encoded signal. We also presented empirical
TTL error distributions of real Internet traffic obtained from
different traffic traces. Finally, we compared the error rates
of the different encoding schemes for idealised and empirical
error distributions.
There are a number of issues left for further research. We are
developing a software framework for testing covert channels
across real networks and for emulating covert channels with
overt traffic taken from traffic traces. This software would
make it possible to measure error rates in real networks
and for emulated overt traffic, allowing us to compare the
theoretical error probabilities with realistic error rates. We also
plan extending our theoretical error probabilities to include bit
errors from lost or reordered overt packets.
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